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Three cases were decided in the past survey period by the South
Carolina Supreme Court dealing with the question of omnibus cover-
age where the teenaged son or daughter of an insured had permitted a
friend to drive a car belonging to the insured. The broader question
decided by these cases was whether consent could "flow through" the
person with permission to a third party.
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Allstate In-
surance Co.,' Ricky James, the son of the insured, had asked a friend,
David Lasater, to pick up a pair of slacks for him at a downtown
department store. David drove the car, provided for Ricky by his fath-
er, to make the trip and was involved in automobile collision. Mr.
Wallace James' insurer, State Farm, brought an action against All-
state, Lasater's insurer, seeking a declaratory judgment that David
Lasater was not an additional insured under the omnibus coverage of
the automobile liability policy issued to Mr. James. The trial judge
sitting without a jury, found that he was not, since Mr. James had
specifically forbidden Ricky to let anyone outside the family drive the
car. On one occasion, Mr. James had learned that Ricky had allowed
friends to drive the car and had admonished him to allow no one else
to do so.
Allstate, on appeal, contended that "the named insured's prohibi-
tion against the car being operated by a third person [was] not control-
ling, nor even germane.''2 It urged the court to recognize a distinction
between the verbs "use" and "operate" as follows:
A person is said to "operate" a car when he manipulates its
controls by driving it. One "uses" a car, by contrast, when he
employs it for a particular purpose. At the time of the accident
the Chevrolet was being "used" for a purpose consented to by the
named insured, Mr. James. Specifically, David was running an
everyday errand for Ricky-just the sort of thing for which the car
had been provided. . . .David's "use" was with the consent of
the named insured, whose express prohibition against "opera-
tion" by a third person was irrelevant.3
1. 179 S.E.2d 203 (S.C. 1971).
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The court noted that a number of cases from other jurisdictions
had accepted the distinction urged by the appellant.4 Finding the vehicle
to have been employed at the time of the accident for a permitted
purpose or use, those cases had extended omnibus coverage to the third
person despite the named insured's express prohibition against his op-
eration. The court did not find those cases persuasive, because of the
decisive difference in the terminology of the omnibus coverage afforded
from that provided by statute in South Carolina. The language of the
omnibus coverage in those cases was found to be virtually identical to
that contained in Hanover Insurance Co. v. Miesemer.5 The policy in
that case covered "any . . .person using [the insured] automobile,
provided the actual use thereof is with the permission of the named
insured .. ."6 The court reasoned that, under such language, it was
the "actual use" which must have been permitted. A permitted "actual
use" and, therefore, coverage could be found even with an express
prohibition against "operation" by the third person involved.'
The South Carolina Supreme Court concluded:
Our Section 46-750.31, 8 by contrast, conceded by appellant
to bound the scope of respondent's omnibus coverage, extends it
to "any person who uses [the insured vehicle] with the consent,
expressed or implied, of the named insured. . . ." Under this
language it is the person using the vehicle, and claiming omnibus
coverage, who must have the consent of the named insured. Con-
sent must run to the "person who uses," as well as to the use he
makes. To hold otherwise would, we think, do violence to the
language of the statute. 0
Another contention of Allstate was that Ricky James' dominion
over the insured car "was so unrestricted that for purposes of coverage
under the omnibus clause he should be considered an owner of the
car."" Appellant also urged that since he had made several payments
4. See Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 10 (1965).
5. 42 Misc.2d 881, 249 N.Y.S.2d 87 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
6. Id. at 883, 249 N.Y.S.2d at 89.
7. 179 S.E.2d at 204-5 (S.C. 197 1). "The somewhat different verbiage of the omni-
bus clause involved in State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 175 S.E.2d
478 (W. Va. 1970), conveys the same idea; it is the 'actual use' which must be permit-
ted." 179 S.E.2d at 205, n.1.
8. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.31 (Supp. 1970).
9. Id.
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on the car following its purchase, Ricky had gained an equitable inter-
est in its ownership. The court dismissed this contention as well, stating
that the omnibus coverage depended upon the consent, not of the owner
but of the named insured, Mr. James."
In Dearybury v. New Hampshire Insurance Company,'3 a case
decided the same day, there were only immaterial differences in the fact
situation. Gloria Dearybury, against the expressed prohibition of her
father, had allowed a friend to drive the car furnished for her use. While
the friend was driving, an accident occurred in which she was seriously
injured. The lower court found that the friend was an insured under the
omnibus clause of Mr. Dearybury's automobile liability insurance pol-
icy issued by New Hampshire Insurance Company. Relying upon the
annotated cases referred to in State Farm," it held that it was immater-
ial whether Gloria's father had forbidden her to allow another to drive
the car, saying, "It is the permission to use and not the permission to
operate which is controlling."' 5
The supreme court, in reversing, stated that such conclusion was
opposed to its opinion in State Farm, unless it was justified by policy
language affording broader omnibus coverage then required by South
Carolina statute. In this instance, the court found that the policy defini-
tion of an insured adhered strictly to the statute and did not broaden
the definition in any way." Instead, as the court noted, its purpose was
to provide a shield against the liberal construction of omnibus coverage
which holds that permission to use an automobile for one purpose
implies permission to use it for all purposes. 7
The third case dealing with similar facts, Southern Farm Bureau
Casulaty Insurance Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.,'" again
ruled against omnibus coverage for a friend of the insured's permittee.
12. Id.
13. 179 S.E.2d 206 (S.C. 1971).
14. See n. 4, supra.
15. 179 S.E.2d at 207.
16. The policy clause in this case provided:
Persons insured: the following are insureds under Part 1:
...any other person using such automobile with the permission of the
named insured, provided his actual operation or (if he is not operating) his
other actual use thereof is within the scope of such permission. . . . Id.
17. Id. The supreme court rejected such construction as unsound in Rakestraw v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 238 S.C. 217, 227, 119 S.E.2d 746, 750 (1961).
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The testimony had shown that the insured had instructed his son not
to allow any other person to drive any of the cars entrusted to him and
had failed to show any implied or expressed consent for the friend to
drive the car when it was involved in the accident. The court ruled that
the burden of proof was upon the party taking the position that there
was coverage under the omnibus clause to show that expressed or
implied permission actually existed and the burden had not been met.
The court stated:
The permission which puts the omnibus or extended coverage
clause of the policy of insurance into operation may be either
expressed or implied, but whether the permission be expressly
granted or impliedly conferred, it must originate in the language
or the conduct of the named insured or some one having authority
to bind [him] in that respect .... 19
The court, following the rule adopted in Dearybury and State Farm,
found that because of the lack of expressed or implied consent, the
automobile liability policy of the insured did not cover his son's friend.
In all of the foregoing cases, Associate Justice Lewis dissented on
the grounds that it was immaterial whether or not the insured had
forbidden his permittee to -allow another to drive. Justice Lewis rea-
soned that if the third person was driving the automobile with the
permission of the permittee and the use to which the automobile was
being put was within the scope of the original permission, the third
person should be afforded coverage under the omnibus clause."0
Associate Justice Bussey concurred in the conclusion reached in
the three cases that the respective drivers were not using such vehicles
with the "consent, express or implied, of the named insured[s). ' '21
However, he raised the interesting question of whether the drivers of
the vehicles were guests in such vehicles, within the contemplation of
Section 46-750.31,22 and afforded coverage by virtue of that statute. He
would have remanded each of the cases for the consideration and adju-
dication of such questions.2z
19. 179 S.E.2d at 456, quottng from Rakestraw v. Allstate Ins. Co., 238 S.C. 217,
223, 119 S.E.2d 746, 748 (1961) (court's emphasis).
20. Dearybury v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 179 S.E.2d 206, 208-9 (S.C. 1971).
21. 179S.E.2d at 207.
22. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.31 (Supp. 1970). The term "insured," as defined in
this section, includes the following: "and a guest in such motor vehicle to which the
policy applies .. "
23. Dearybury v. New Hampshire Ins. Co., 179 S.E.2d 206, 207-8 (S.C. 1971).
1971]
4
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 4 [1971], Art. 8
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol23/iss4/8
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
One other case during the survey period, Boston Old Colony In-
surance Co. v. C.B. Prentiss & Co.,24 dealt with omnibus clause cover-
age, but it involved the question of employer-employee permission.
Cornelius J. Baker, the teen-aged nephew of the president of C.B.
Prentiss & Company, was provided a panel truck to use in connection
with his employment. He was allowed to drive the truck back and forth
to work and to keep it at his home at night and on weekends. One
evening he had the truck out for his personal use and struck a pedestri-
an. The company's insurer, Boston Old Colony, denied coverage and
brought an action for declaratory judgment. The lower court found
implied permission on the part of the insured, and the insurer appealed
the decision.
The appellant contended that there was no implied consent in the
absence of Baker having actually had a reasonable belief that consent
to his use was intended. Baker had testified that he had known at the
time of the accident that he did not have permission. Appellant argued
that what was in Baker's mind, as reflected by his testimony, was con-
clusive of the issue.21 In support of its contention, it strongly relied on
certain language in Crenshaw v. Harleysville Mutual Casualty Co.2"
which stated:
Generally, in the case of employer and employee, there must
be some conduct on the part of the employer sufficient to raise in
the mind of the employee a reasonable belief that consent was
intended.Y
The supreme court, in dismissing the appellant's argument,
stated that the issue of whether or not there was implied consent
could not rest solely upon the testimony of the employee as to what
was in his mind at the time, regardless of any other testimony. The
court stated the test to be, instead, "whether or not under all the
circumstances disclosed by the evidence the employee reasonably
had the right to assume consent or permission."2 It quoted further
from the decision in Crenshaw:
Consent to the use by an employee of his employer's automo-
bile, outside the scope of his employment, will be implied only if
24. 180S.E.2d 653 (S.C. 1971).
25. Id. at 656.
26. 246 S.C. 549, 144 S.E.2d 810 (1965).
27. Id. at 554, 144 S.E.2d at 8 12-13 (emphasis added).
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there has been "a course of conduct or a practice with the knowl-
edge and acquiescence of the owner, such as would indicate to a
reasonable mind that the employee had the right to assume per-
mission under the particular circumstances."' z
The supreme court noted that there was evidence that Prentiss had
known and acquiesced in the use of the truck by Baker to take his
grandmother, the mother-in-law of Prentiss, to work at night. There
was also testimony susceptible of the inference that Prentiss knew of
Baker's use of the truck on several occasions for his purely personal
pleasure. The court further noted that Prentiss had completed and
forwarded a form to the South Carolina Highway Department certify-
ing that Baker had been insured at the time of the accident in order
for Baker to retain his driver's license. The court reasoned that such
evidence gave rise to the inference that "Baker did, in fact, have per-
mission to drive the truck at the time of the accident.
'30
1I. CONTRIBUTION BETWEEN INSURANCE COMPANIES
The case of Nationwide Insurance Co. v. Hartford Accident &
Indemnity Co.31 involved an action brought by Nationwide to recover
from Hartford, a pro rata share of the $8,000 it had paid to one J.R.
Mixson as a result of accidental injuries. Mixson had been injured
while a passenger in a trailer insured by Hartford under an automobile
liability insurance policy issued to C. W. Priester and covering the
operation of the trailer and anyone using it with Priester's consent.
With the permission of Priester, the trailer was being pulled by Ellis
Hunt, who had his automobile insured with Nationwide. Mixson
brought an action against both men and their respective insurance
companies undertook to defend the suit. At trial Priester was granted
a nonsuit and counsel for Hartford left the courtroom and did not
further participate. Prior to the rendering of a verdict, Nationwide
settled the claim for $8,000.
In its complaint, Nationwide alleged, that the Hartford policy, as
well as its own, contained a pro rata clause and that the companies were
jointly liable to Hunt for the payment of the whole amount. Nation-
wide alleged further that by making settlement payment, it became
29. 246 S.C. at 554, 144 S.E.2d at 813, quoting from U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co.
v. Brann, 297 Ky. 381, 384, 180 S.W.2d 102, 104 (1944).
30. 180 S.E.2d at 656.
31. 178 S.E.2d 660 (S.C. 1971).
1971]
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subrogated to the rights of Hunt against Hartford and became entitled
to recover from Hartford its pro rata share of the amount paid in
settlement of the claim. 2 Hartford demurred to the complaint, declar-
ing no cause of action existed because the plaintiff had made payment
as a volunteer and thus was not entitled to contribution.-
Upon the sustaining of the demurrer, Nationwide appealed. The
supreme court noted that the effect of sustaining the demurrer was to
hold, as a matter of law, that the only reasonable inference to be drawn
from the allegations of the complaint was that Nationwide had paid
as a volunteer and was not entitled to subrogation. The court, however,
thought a question of fact had been raised for the determination of the
trial court. In reversing, the court stated:
Nationwide not only had its own interest to protect, but had
a legal obligation to defend the suit and to pay a judgment when
and if procured; and also had a legal and moral duty to use care
in negotiating a settlement so as to protect Hunt from exposure
to the possibility of having to pay some amount above the policy
coverage.3 ' Taking the allegations of the complaint as true, Hart-
ford had a similar obligation to Hunt.5
III. UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE
A. Public Carrier
Weeks v. Friday36 was an action brought by Ora Bell Weeks, for
injuries received when the taxicab she was driving collided with an
uninsured motorist. The insurer, Canal Insurance Company, moved
that service be quashed, arguing that its policy did not contain unin-
sured motorist coverage, nor was it required to do so. The circuit court
quashed the service and Weeks appealed.
The supreme court stated that Section 46-750.33 of the South
Carolina Code 37 forbids the issuance or deliveryof any policy of per-
sonal injury or property damage automobile liability insurance, unless
it contains uninsured motorist coverage. The court noted further that
32. Id. at 661-62.
33. Id. at 661.
34. See Tyger River Pine Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 170 S.C. 286, 170 S.E. 346
(1933).
35. 178 S.E.2d at 662.
36. 179 S.E.2d 909 (S.C. 1971).
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although this section was a part of the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsi-
bility Act, presently codified as Chapter 8 of Title 46, it had rejected
the view that the section's application was restricted to policies required
to be certified under that act.3 Therefore, the court ruled that the fact
that the policy issued by Canal was not certified to the Highway De-
partment, as proof of financial responsibility under the act, did not
immunize it from the uninsured motorist requirement.
39
Canal relied on two other sections of Chapter 8 in arguing that it
was immune from the requirement. The first, Section 46-702(7)(i) stat-
ed:
Other required policies unaffected. [Chapter 8] shall not be held
to apply to or affect policies of automobile insurance against lia-
bility insuring public carriers or policies which may be required
by any other law of this state, any law or ordinance of any munici-
pality or any [federal law], and those policies, if they contain an
agreement or are endorsed to conform with the requirements of
this chapter, may be certified as proof of financial responsibility
under [Chapter 8].41
Canal contended that, since its policy insured a common carrier and
was required by municipal ordinance and by virtue of the above statute,
Chapter 8 with its uninsured motorist provisions did not apply to the
policy.4
The court reviewed the legislative history of the quoted statute and
noted that twenty-seven years before its passage in original form, the
legislature had subjected the public carrier industry to mandatory in-
surance requirements. 2 Public carriers were required to hold insurance
policies containing provisions prescribed by the Highway Commission
(now the Public Service Commission), which differed significantly
from the corresponding provisions which a policy had to contain in
order to be certified under the Safety Responsibility Act. The court
concluded:
38. 179 S.E.2d at 910. See Hatchett v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 244 S.C. 425,
137 S.E.2d 608 (1964); cf. Pacific Ins. Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 247 S.C. 282,
147 S.E.2d 273 (1966).
39. 179 S.E.2d at 910.
40. Id. at 910-11, quoting from S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-702(7)(i) (Supp. 1970).
41. 179S.E.2dat91I.
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No reason has been suggested, and none occurs to us, for
denying uninsured motorist coverage to insureds under liability
policies issued on taxicabs. We are persuaded that the legislature
did not intend this inharmonious result and that Section 23(a) of
the Act, the parent of Section 46-702(7)(i), was intended merely
to forestall the contention that certification of a policy under the
Act would obviate the need for compliance with the more vigorous
policy requirements of other applicable laws and regulations
.... We are convinced that this construction, which we adopt,
conforms to the intention of the legislature.' 3
Canal also invoked Section 46-70411 as a bar to the application of
Chapter 8 to the taxicab policy it had issued. The relevant part of that
section reads:
[Chapter 8] shall not apply with respect to any [government-
owned vehicle], nor, except for certain named sections, shall it
apply, with respect to any motor vehicle which is subject to other
laws of this State which require their owners to carry insurance
or to place security, in a manner which would make those owners
carry insurance, or place security in addition to the amounts re-
quired by this chapter.
45
The court denied the availability of the proffered section's application
to Canal, because it failed to show that its policy insured a motor
vehicle "subject to other laws of this State which require [its owner]
to carry insurance."' 4 The court noted that the section only sought to
forbid the application of Chapter 8 in such a way as to impose on
mandatory insureds a second, cumulative requirement as to policy
limits. Thus, as the court inferred, the chapter's application to those
mandatorily insured under other laws was contemplated, so long as the
sole proscribed result was avoided. 4
43. 179 S.E.2d at 911.
44. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-704 (1962).
45. 179 S.E.2d at 911, quoting from S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-704 (1962).
46. 179S.E.2dat91.
47. Id. The court felt that this view of§ 46-704 was reinforced by a comparison of
its provisions with those of the Virginia code section [VA CODE ANN. § 46.1-392 (Repl.
1967)], from which it was fashioned. The Virginia section treats state-owned vehicles and
mandatorily insured public carrier vehicles alike, exempting both from most of that
state's financial responsibility act. The South Carolina section, by contrast, distinguishes
the two classes, following Virginia's exemption only as to government-owned vehicles.
This distinction, the court pointed out, indicated an intention to depart from that state's
financial responsibility act. Id. at 912. See Laird v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 243 SC. 388,
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The court dismissed Canal's last contention that orders of the
Insurance Commission indicated that companies issuing policies re-
quired by other state laws were to be treated differently from policies
under the Safety Responsibility Act. It stated that the orders failed to
show that the administrative practice resulted from the sections inter-
preted in this case.4"
B. Effect of Settlement and Release
Wallace v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.49 was an action
brought by an administratrix for her intestate's wrongful death against
his insurer under its uninsured motorist coverage. The intestate had
been injured in an automobile collision and there had been a question
as to whether the other party was covered by liability insurance. Wal-
lace entered into an agreement with Nationwide whereby he agreed
that, in the event the other insurer avoided responsibility, he would
accept the sum of $1,500 "for his bodily injuries and property damage
sustained in the collision."5 Thereafter, Wallace died as a result of his
original injuries and a judgment was secured against the owner and
operator of the adverse automobile in the sum of $40,000. After it was
determined that the other ifisurer could not be held liable, Nationwide
argued that it was required to pay only the amount in keeping with the
agreement made with the intestate and the lower court ruled in its
favor.
On appeal, the supreme court read the circuit order as limiting
recovery on the theory that the result was required by the decision in
Price v. Richmond & Danville Railroad.5 1 That case was in tort for the
wrongful death of the victim who, prior to his death, had settled with
the wrongdoer for his injury. Recovery was denied upon the ground
that the statute 2 limited the administratrix to recovery only in cases
in which the injured party could have recovered if he had survived.
"Since the release would have barred recovery by the victim in his
lifetime, the Court held that the action for wrongful death did not
lie."
48. 179S.E.2dat912.
49. 182S.E.2d 84 (S.C. 1971).
50. Id. at 85-6.
51. 33 S.C. 556, 12 S.E. 413 (1890). This case was followed in Rish v. Seaboard
Air Line Ry., 106 S.C. 143, 90 S.E. 704 (1916).
52. S.C. CODE ANN. § 10-1951 (1962).
53. 182 S.E.2d at 85.
1971]
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The court noted, however, that in this case the plaintiff had al-
ready recovered judgment against the wrongdoer for the death of her
husband. The tort-feaser, who had made no settlement with the injured
party, could not have defended the action on the rationale of the Price
case. The court could not perceive how the insurance company, against
which no rights need have been, nor were, asserted under the wrongful
death statute, could defend on that rationale.5
The court stated that the plaintiff was entitled to recovery to the
full extent of the defendant's contractual obligation to pay unless the
defendant, by contract with the intestate, had been absolved of liability
in excess of $1,500. It noted further that the written promise of the
intestate, upon which the defendant relied upon as a release, was no
more than a conditional agreement to settle his claim for "property
damage and bodily injury."5 The court concluded:
[T]he words of the instrument make plain the agreement relied
upon simply does not modify the carrier's obligation with respect
to this claim, founded upon a judgment for damages for wrongful
death, as to which the intestate contracted only by the insuring
agreement. 56
In Lawson v. Porter,5 7 the plaintiff's insurer, National Grange
Mutual Insurance Company, had been served with the summons and
complaint because it was anticipated that the defendant's insurer would
deny liability coverage. National Grange sought to have the service set
aside on the ground that the plaintiff had executed a "Release and
Trust Agreement," by which it was released from any liability under
the uninsured motorist provision of its policy. The circuit court denied
the motion and National Grange appealed.
The supreme court observed that the service was required by stat-
ute, in that Section 46-750.33 of the Code provides:
No action shall be brought under the uninsured motorist provision
unless copies of the pleadings in the action establishing such liabil-
ity are served in the manner provided by law upon the insurance
carrier writing such uninsured motorist provision. The insurance
carrier shall have the right to appear and defend in the name of
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and shall have twenty days after service of process on it in which
to make such appearance. :..51
The court stated that recovery under the uninsured endorsement
was subject to the condition that the insured establish legal liability on
the part of the uninsured motorist. An action ex delicto must be
brought in which the only issues are that of liability and the amount
of damage. After judgment against the uninsured motorist has been
secured, a direct action ex contractu could be brought to recover from
the insurance company on its endorsement. In the latter action, policy
defenses could be properly raised by the insurance company."
The court held that the trial judge was correct in holding that the
release and subrogation rights of National Grange, plaintiff's insurer,
were irrelevant to a determination of the liability of the defendant.
National Grange could not plead any policy defenses and any rights
under the "Release and Trust Agreement" until the plaintiff had ob-
tained a judgment against the defendant and had brought an action ex
contractu against National Grange."
Senn v. J.S. Weeks & Co.6" dealt with the question of whether the
settlement by a plaintiff of his insurance carrier's liability under its
uninsured motorist endorsement affected the liability of a joint tort-
feasor. Senn had secured a judgment against an uninsured motorist for
injuries and property damage resulting from a collision caused by the
motorist's negligence. Senn's liability insurance carrier paid to him the
sum of $5,000 under the uninsured motorist provisions of his policy,
taking from him a Trust Agreement for the payment. Thereafter, Senn
brought an action against the Weeks company, alleging that a truck
owned by the defendant had been parked by its agent in a "no parking"
zone at the intersection, so as to obscure the stop sign from the view
of the driver whose car collided with Senn's. The action resulted in a
judgment in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant appealed.
After discussing questions of negligence and evidence, the supreme
58. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.33 (Supp. 1970).
59. 180 S.E.2d at 644. See Squires v. National Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 247 S.C. 58,
145 S.E.2d 673 (1965); Sheffield v. American Indem. Co., 245 S.C. 389, 140 S.E.2d 787
(1965); Hatchett v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 244 S.C. 425, 137 S.E.2d 608 (1964);
Vernon v. Harleysville Mut. Cas. Co., 244 S.C. 152, 135 S.E.2d 841 (1964); Laird v.
Nationwide Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 388, 134 S.E.2d 206 (1964).
60. 180 S.E.2d at 644.
61. 180 S.E.2d 336 (S.C. 1971).
19711
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court considered the appellant's contention that the settlement by the
plaintiff with his insurance carrier should be construed either as a
settlement and release of one joint tortfeasor, thereby releasing the
defendant from liability, or as a covenant not to sue, entitling the
defendant to credit on the judgment against it for the amount paid to
plaintiff under the settlement. Since the requirement of uninsured mo-
torist coverage is statutory, the court turned to the provisions of the
statutes in determining the effect of the settlement."
The court noted that when an insurance company pays a claim
under the uninsured motorist provisions of its policy, it becomes subro-
gated to that extent to the rights of its insured. The extent of these
subrogation rights is set forth in Section 46-750.36 as follows:
An insurance carrier paying a claim under the uninsured mo-
torist provision required by Section 46-750.33 shall be subrogated
to the rights of the insured to whom such claim was paid against
any and every person causing such injury, death or damage to the
extent that payment was made .... 63
Since the defendant's conduct, along with that of the uninsured motor-
ist, had allegedly caused the plaintiff's damages, the plaintiff's carrier
was subrogated not only to the plaintiff's rights against the uninsured
motorist, but also to those against the defendant."4
In construing the uninsured motorist law, the supreme court has
held that its purpose was not to provide coverage upon an uninsured
vehicle to the public, but to afford additional protection to an insured
motorist. The uninsured motorist provision is a contractual liability
required by statute between the insured motorist and his carrier and
inures solely to the benefit of the insured."
The court denied the contention of the defendant that the instru-
ment executed by the plaintiff in settlement of the liability of his insurer
was a release of a joint tortfeasor. It pointed out that the uninsured
motorist had not been a party to the agreement and had had no interest
in the settlement. The only effect of the instrument was to settle the
liability of the plaintiffs insurer and to recognize the insurer's statu-
tory right of subrogation against any person who might have caused
62. Id. at 339.
63. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.36 (Supp. 1970) (court's emphasis).
64. 180 S.E.2d at 339.
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the damage. The court declared also that, for the same reasons, the
instrument could not have the effect of a covenant not to sue a tortfea-
sor. Only the right of the plaintiff to sue his insurer had been affected."
C. Unknown Motorist
Wynn v. Doe67 was an action brought by Gloria Wynn ' against
"John Doe," 6" an unknown motorist, to establish liability for injuries
sustained by her when her motorcycle hit a slick, chemical substance
on the highway, causing it to go out of control. Wynn contended that
since there was actual and physical contact with the chemical substance
dumped or spilled onto the public highway by an unidentified and
unknown vehicle, the "physical contact" requirement of the statute
was met.
The supreme court, in dismissing the contention, stated that the
statute makes proof of physical contact a condition precedent in any
case for the recovery of damages caused by an unknown driver and
vehicle and that there were no exceptions to the rule.69 There had been
no actual physical contact between the unknown vehicle and the motor-
cycle operated by Wynn, and its absence was fatal to her cause of
action. To adopt the proffered view, the court declared, would defeat
the clear and unambiguous legislative intent expressed in the statute. 0
IV. LIBEL ACTION AGAINST AN INSURER
Prentiss v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. 71 was a libel action
brought by an insured's wife against his insurer for charging that she
was mentally retarded. Nationwide had cancelled the husband's insur-
66. 180 S.E.2d at 339.
67. 180 S.E.2d 95 (S.C. 1971).
68. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.34 (Supp. 1970) provides:
If the owner or operator of any motor vehicle which causes bodily
injury or property damage to the insured be unknown, there shall be no
right of action or recovery under the uninsured motorist provision, unless
(2) The injury or damage was caused by physical contact with the un-
known vehicle.
A remedy for the enforcement of such liability is provided by the authorization of
an action against the unknown motorist in the fictional name of "John Doe", with the
right given to the insurance carrier to defend in such name. Id. § 46-750.35.
69. See Coker v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 251 S.C. 175, 161 S.E.2d 175 (1968).
70. 180 S.E.2d at 96.
71. 181 S.E.2d 325 (S.C. 1971).
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ance and advised him that, upon request in writing, he was entitled by
law7" to be informed of the specific facts which caused the termination
of coverage. Upon such a request, Nationwide advised him that it had
discovered that he had misrepresented certain facts in his application.
The application had shown that he had had no accidents and his wife
was not a driver of the automobile. Nationwide reported to him that
their investigation had shown that he had been involved in an accident
and that his wife did drive the car and "that she is mentally retarded."
73
The trial judge directed a verdict in favor of the defendant, holding that
the letter was qualifiedly privileged and the plaintiff had failed to prove
express malice or malice in fact to destroy such privilege.74
The supreme court, in affirming, stated:
The respondent being under the statutory duty to give an
explanation, in response to the request by the insured, as to its
reason or reasons for cancelling his policy, compliance with such
request was qualifiedly privileged. 75 The letter containing the al-
leged libelous statement was, pursuant to statute, a qualifiedly
privileged communication, and such rebuts the inference of malice
and, in order to overcome the defense of qualified privilege, the
appellant had to prove express malice or malice in fact on the part
of the respondent toward her.76
The court observed that the evidence revealed that Mrs. Prentiss
was an epileptic and had been treated for the disease at the South
Carolina Medical College Hospital and the South Carolina State Hos-
pital. Also, Mrs. Prentiss had testified that she did not know any of
Nationwide's employees who had connection with the writing of the
letter or any reason for any of them to have animosity against her. The
court thus concluded that there was no evidence in the record to support
a finding of the existence of actual or express malice, or the abuse of
the qualified privilege.
77
72. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.54 (Supp. 1970).
73. 181 S.E.2d at 326.
74. Id.
75. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-750.53 (Supp. 1970) provides:
[T]hat as between the company or its agent and the named insured or any
other person who customarily operates an automobile insured under the
policy the reasons specified for cancellation in the notice of cancellation
shall constitute a privilege communication and in an action for libel arising
therefrom the defendant shall be entitled to assert the defense of qualified
privilege as defined and limited by the common law of this State.
76. 181 S.E.2d at 327.
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V. INSURER'S OBLIGATION-ATTACHABLE DEBT?
In Howard v. Allen,7 the plaintiff was injured when she was struck
by the propellor of an aircraft, while upon the ground, at Greenville
Municipal Airport. The defendant, alleged to be the operator of the
aircraft, was a resident of Ohio. The plaintiff, having been unable to
obtain personal service of process upon the defendant in South Caroli-
na, caused to be issued a summons, complaint and warrant of attach-
ment, directing the Sheriff of Spartanburg County to attach and seize
"the applicable limits of liability and the duty to defend contained in
Policy No. NM6-625, issued by American Motorists Insurance Com-
pany. . . ."7 The process was served upon an agent of the insurance
company. On motion of the defendant, the lower court quashed service
and vacated the warrant of attachment.
80
In urging that the attachment was proper, the plaintiff appellant
relied solely upon the decision of the Court of Appeals of New York
in Seider v. Roth,"' there being no South Carolina decision in point.
The supreme court observed that there are some important distinctions
between the language of the New York attachment statutes and those
of South Carolina and stated that, aside therefrom, they were not
convinced of the soundness of the majority opinion in Seider. It noted
further that no state had followed the New York court in this respect
and that the decision in Seider had been criticised by legal writers on
both constitutional and practical grounds. 2 In addition, several courts
in other jurisdictions had reached results or conclusions contrary to
Seider.8
78. 254 S.C. 455, 176 S.E.2d 127 (1970).
79. Id. at 457, 176 S.E.2d at 128.
80. Id. at 458, 176 S.E.2d at 128.
81. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99, 216 N.E.2d 312 (1966). This decision was
subsequently followed in Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 287 N.Y.S.2d 663, 234
N.E.2d 669 (1967) and Victor v. Lyon Associates, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 695, 287 N.Y.S.2d
424, 234 N.E.2d 459 (1967).
82. See Attachment of Liability Insurance Policies, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 1108
(1968); Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction Based on Insurer's Obligation, 19 STAN. L. REV. 654
(1967); Reese, The Expanding Scope of Jurisdiction over Non-Residents-New York
Goes Wild, 35 INS. COUNSEL J. 118 (1968); Attachment of "'Obligations"-A New
Chapter in Long Arm Jurisdiction, 16 BUFFALO L. REV. 769 (1967); Garnishment of
Intangibles: Contingent Obligations and the Interstate Corporation, 67 COL. L. REV. 550
(1967).
83. 254 S.C. at 459, 176 S.E.2d at 129. See De Rentiis v. Lewis, 258 A.2d 464 (R.I.
1969); Housley v. Anaconda Co., 19 Utah 2d 124, 427 P.2d 390 (1967); Jardine v.
Donelly, 413 Pa. 474, 198 A.2d 513 (1964).
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The court noted that previous decisions" had quoted with ap-
proval from Drake on Attachment" as follows:
A fundamental principle is that an attaching creditor can
acquire no greater right in attached property than defendant had
at the time of attachment. If, therefore, the property is in such a
situation that the defendant has lost his power over it, or has not
yet acquired some interest in, or power over, it as to permit him
to dispose of it adversely to others, it cannot be attached as his
debt.
The court, in holding that the contractual obligations of an insurer
were not a debt subject to attachment under the law of this state,
declared:
Both the obligation to indemnify and the obligation to defend
are inchoate, conditional, contingent obligations to the insured.
Before they come into play there must be an external event within
the coverage of the policy and the performance of all conditions
precedent by the insured, including his cooperation. There is no
obligation to defend until an action is brought and no obligation
to indemnify until a judgment against the insured is obtained.
Even then, if the insurer's obligations to defend and indemnify are
fully performed, there is nothing of economic value to which the
insured may make claim, receive or assign."'
VI. MISCELLANEOUS
A. Accidental Death
In Gulledge v. Atlantic Coast Life Insurance Co.,s8 the insurance
company sought to avoid making payment under its accidental death
insurance policy issued to Linda Faye Gulledge. The decedent had died
after being shot and run over with an automobile by the jealous wife
of a man with whom she had become romantically involved. The in-
surer alleged that it should not be required to pay, because the death
had not been an accident and had resulted, in part, from her engaging
in activities in violation of statutory law. 9
84. See Charles R. Allen, Inc. v. Island Co-Op Services Ass'n, Ltd., 234 S.C. 537,
109 S.E.2d 446 (1959) and H.J. Baker & Bros. v. Doe, 88 S.C. 69, 70 S.E. 431, 433
(1911).
85. DRAKE ON ATTACHMENT § 243 (1885).
86. 254 S.C. at 461-2, 176 S.E.2d at 130.
87. Id. at 460-1, 176 S.E.2d at 129.
88. 179 S.E.2d 605 (S.C. 1971).
89. A provision in the policy read as follows:
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The supreme court stated that injuries were to be regarded as
accidental unless it could be said that they were a natural or probable
result of the insured's action, reasonably foreseeable by the insured or
by a reasonably prudent person in the same position.9" While the con-
duct of the insured was improper, the court concluded, it was not such
that injury and death should have been foreseen. The court held that
the death was accidental within the meaning of the policy and dismissed
the insurer's contention that it had resulted from violation of statutory
law. It noted that the only violation alleged was that the defendant had
been guilty of adultery, but the evidence failed to support such a find-
ing.9'
In Sellers v. Public Savings Life Insurance Co., 92 the insured had
been left at the site where his truck had skidded into a ditch and was
found the next morning, face down in the water in the ditch. Friends
who had tried to help dislodge the truck testified that the insured had
been all right when they left and no evidence of foul play was found.
The insurer refused to pay double indemnity for accidental death, argu-
ing that it could not be proved that the death had been an accident.
On appeal, the supreme court declared that cause of death, like
any other fact, could be established by circumstantial evidence.93 It
noted that although it had not had the occasion to consider the suffi-
ciency of circumstantial evidence offered to prove that a particular
death was an accidental drowning, several other courts had.9" The court
hereunder for accident or sickness resulting wholly or partly from any of
the following causes or conditions:
F. Any violation of statutory laws or Municipal ordinance.
Id. at 606-7.
90. The court, quoting from Hope v. New York Life Ins. Co. 186 S.C. 85, 195 S.E.
110 (1938), stated the rule to be:
The view preferred and adopted in this state is that one insured, even
if he be the aggressor in an encounter in which he is injured or killed, does
not forfeit his insurance if he could not reasonably anticipate that he would
receive bodily injury or be killed; and that ordinarily makes a question for
the jury. However, if only one reasonable inference can be drawn from the
testimony, then it becomes a question of law to be passed upon by the
Court.
179 S.E.2d at 606.
91. Id. at 606-7.
92. 178 S.E.2d 241 (1970).
93. See Glenn v. Duncan Mills, 242 S.C. 535, 131 S.E.2d 696 (1963).
94. See Annot., 12 A.L.R.2d 1312 (1950).
1971]
18
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 23, Iss. 4 [1971], Art. 8
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol23/iss4/8
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
quoted from Sturm v. Employer's Liability Assurance Corporation"
in concluding:
Where a man, a few minutes after being seen apparently in
good health, is found under water, dead, and nothing more is
known of the cause of death, the immediate conclusion arrived at
is that he was drowned. As the result of common sense and com-
mon experience, that opinion is formed by the normal processes
of almost instant reason, and it may be said that legally such
circumstantial evidence makes out a prima facie case of accidental
drowning.9"
B. Fraudulent Misrepresentations
Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Chavis"7 was an action
brought by the company, seeking to have an automobile liability insur-
ance policy issued to one Bobby Chavis declared void ab initio, because
of fraudulent misrepresentations made on his policy application. He
had asserted that he had a "clean" driving record, but later investiga-
tion had shown violations, accidents, and a suspension. The action was
contested by members of a family who were injured in an accident
causd by Chavis. As respondents, they contended that the insurer
should not have relied on the answers given by Chavis and that an
independent investigation should have been conducted. Having failed
to do so, the company had waived any right to have the policy can-
celled. They also contended that the insurer was estopped from denying
liability in the accident because of its investigation of the accident and
negotiations with the respondents.
The supreme court declared that since the undisputed evidence
showed that the policy had been procured under an application contain-
ing fraudulent misrepresentations, the policy never afforded any cover-
age to Chavis unless the insurer had waived its right to or had become
estopped to assert a denial of coverage.9" The court dismissed the con-
tention of waiver, however, stating that the insurance company had the
right to rely upon the answers in the application 9 and "was under no
duty to investigate the truthfulness of the answers given in the applica-
95. 212 Iil. App. 354 (1918).
96. 178 S.E.2d at 243.
97. 254 S.C. 507, 176 S.E.2d 131 (1970).
98. Id. at 513, 176 S.E.2d at 134.
99. Id. at 517, 176 S.E.2d at 136, citing Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v.
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tion of Chavis, and by its failure to make inquiry as to the truthfulness
of such was neither a waiver nor an estoppel."'
00
As to the question of estoppel because of the insurer's investiga-
tion of the accident, the court noted that it had generally been held that
an insurance company does not waive any defense it may have under a
policy unless it has knowledge of the defense when it investigates a loss
under the policy. The court concluded:
[lI]t is essential that the acts relied on as indicative of waiver
or estoppel shall have been done by the insurer with knowledge of
the facts giving it a right to treat the policy as unenforceable ...
The burden of proof was upon the respondents to show that the
appellant had knowledge of the grounds upon which it could avoid
liability at the time it committed the acts and made the statements
asserted to constitute a waiver or estoppel. This, the respondents
have failed to do. 01
C. Questions of Coverage
In Weeks v. Pilot Life Insurance Co., 02 the decedent-insured had
left the employ of the company through which he had secured group
life insurance. After his return a month later, Weeks was told that his
insurance would be re-instated. An office manager of the company,
upon the advice of an agent of the insurance company, made out a
written statement waiving the usual waiting period for a new employee
and had Weeks fill out an application. He forwarded these documents
and Weeks' premium for the month of December to the insurance
company on December 22. These were not received by Pilot Life until
after the death of Weeks the next day. Pilot Life denied coverage
because it failed to receive the application until after Weeks' death.
The supreme court, in remanding the case to the trial court for the
consideration of the question of estoppel, stated that the company
employing Weeks and its office manager were both agents of the in-
surer as a matter of law, by virtue of a South Carolina statute."3
Further, the case of Greer v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the
100. 254 S.C. at 519, 176 S.E.2d at 137. See State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v.
West, 149 F. Supp. 289 (1957); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Wall, 87 N.J. Super.
543, 210 A.2d 109 (1965) and 92 N.J. Super. 92, 222 A.2d 282 (1966); Washington
Realty Co. v. American Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 252 S.C. 618, 167 S.E.2d 617 (1969).
101. 254 S.C. at 524, 176 S.E.2d at 139.
102. 180 S.E.2d 875 (S.C. 1971).
103. S.C. CODE ANN. § 37-233 (1962).
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United States,"4 without mention or reliance upon the above-men-
tioned statute, had held an employee to be an agent of the insurer under
circumstances indistinguishable from those in the present case.0 3 The
court reasoned that the question of coverage would never have arisen,
but for the acts or omissions of the agents of the insurer. If they had
acted more promptly, the controversy would have been prevented. The
neglect of either of its agents, the court concluded, was chargeable to
the prinicipal, Pilot Life, not to Weeks, the employee.'
Jordan v. Maryland Casualty Co.0 7 was an action brought by a
fireman, claiming entitlement to disability and medical benefits under
a group life insurance policy issued to his employer. Jordan had been
accidentally shot while on duty, but while watching television in the
firestation's recreation room. The insuring agreement extended cover-
age to a regularly employed, full-time fireman, only "while actually on
duty at fires, while answering alarms of fires, or while directly returning
from fires."'08 The supreme court held that since none of the stated
conditions accompanied the infliction of the injury, coverage had to be
denied.
Kidd v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.' 0 was an action
brought to recover, under the comprehensive clause of the insured's
policy, the value of an eight track stereo system and forty-five tapes
which had been stolen from the insured's automobile. The question
presented to the supreme court was whether the stolen property had
been equipment of the automobile within the meaning of the policy
provision which insured against loss or damage to the "automobile and
its equipment." "0
The court noted that tape stereo systems had been available for a
number of years as optional equipment on new cars or for installation
in others. It observed that, although the stolen stereo had not been
bolted under the dashboard, it had been placed therein with the inten-
tion of devoting it to use as an automobile stereo, had been connected
104. 180 S.C. 162, 185 S.E. 68 (1936).
105. 180 S.E.2d at 877. See also Coker v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 188 S.C. 472, 199
S.E. 694 (1938).
106. 180 S.E.2d at 878.
107. 181 S.E.2d 476 (S.C. 1971).
108. Id.
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to the electrical system, and had been used exclusively for that purpose
for a considerable period before the theft. The court concluded, in
accord with the rule requiring that doubts as to construction be re-
solved in favor of the insured, that the stereo system was equipment
within the coverage of the policy. It held to the contrary, however, as
to the tapes. Noting that the tapes could be played in an automobile,
a home or elsewhere, the court held that, although they had been of
the contents of the automobile at the time of the theft, their connection
with it was too tenuous to make them equipment within the policy's
definition."'
In Beattie Bonded Warehouse Co. v. General Accident Fire & Life
Corporation, Ltd.," 2 the insured's warehouse had collapsed and it
sought to recover under its insurance policy which protected against
loss by windstorm. The district court found that the building had been
settling or listing perceptively for a considerable period of time before
the time of the collapse and that there had been no winds of violence
or tumultous force on the day of collapse.
The court concluded, as a matter of law, that the collapse of the
warehouse had not been caused by a windstorm within the coverage of
defendant's policy. It quoted Phenix Insurance Co. v. Charleston
Bridge Co."' to the effect that, in order for the insured to recover, it
would have had to show that the windstorm "was the predominating
and efficient cause, the cause which produces the disaster without any
new intervening cause, which of itself would have been sufficient to
produce the result.'"
D. Conspiracy to Defraud Policyholders
In State v. Lagerquist" eleven officers and employees of the Ken-
nesaw Life and Accident Insurance Company had been found guilty of
criminal conspiracy to unlawfully obtain insurance dividend funds."'
Francis Marion Life Insurance Company had been acquired by Kenne-
saw through merger and stock exchange in 1961 and in 1965, officials
111. Id. at 202.
112. 315 F. Supp. 996 (D.S.C. 1970).
113. 65 F. 628, 632 (4th Cir. 1895).
114. 315 F. Supp. at 1001. See also Granger v. Aetna Ins. Co., 344 F.2d 942, 943
(1965).
115. 180 S.E.2d 882 (S.C. 1971).
116. SeeS.C. CODE ANN. §§ 16-366, 37-251, 37-253 (1962).
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of Kennesaw decided upon a plan to attempt to persuade its policyhold-
ers to convert accumulated savings carried over from Francis Marion
into additional life insurance prepaid for a fixed number of years. A
sales meeting was held in Greenville, South Carolina in October, 1965,
at which, the state charged, the defendants conspired to defraud the
Francis Marion policyholders of their accumulated savings.
On appeal the defendants stressed "the open and honest" nature
of the regular sales meeting at which the alleged conspiracy occurred
and contended that no conspiracy could conceivably have taken place
at such a meeting. The supreme court dismissed this contention, and
in affirming, noted that it was clearly inferable from the evidence that
the salesmen had been instructed to conceal the fact that the policy-
holders' own accumulated savings would be used for purchase of new
policies. In addition, there was evidence that, in their actual contacts
with the policyholders, the defendants had done just what had been
planned at the meeting.
17
E. Writ of Prohibition Against The Insurance Commissioner
Berry v. Lindsay"' was a class action brought against John W.
Lindsay, Chief Insurance Commissioner, seeking a Writ of Prohibition
"'restraining the issuance of additional rate increases for automobile
liability insurance so long as the Insurance Industry as a whole is
showing a profit.""' Judge John A. Mason of the Richland County
Court, in an order affirmed per curiam by the supreme court, sustained
a demurrer to the petition, giving three reasons for the denial of the
writ. First, the Writ of Prohibition would not lie to prohibit one from
performing a particular function unless it were a judicial or quasi-
judicial function. The court noted that although the South Carolina
Supreme Court had not considered the question, numerous state and
federal courts had consistently held that rate making is a legislative
function.'
117. 180 S.E.2d at 886-87.
118. 182 S.E.2d 78 (S.C. 1971).
119. Id. at 79.
120. Id. at 82. See Oklahoma Operating Co. v. Love, 252 U.S. 331 (1919); Wilson
& Company v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 126 P.2d 1009, 1010, 1014 (1942); State v.
Railroad Commissioners of Florida, 84 So. 444, 445, 446 (1920); Spring Valley Water
Works v. Bartlett, 63 Calif. 245, 246 (1883). See also 16 C.J.S. Constitutional
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Secondly, the court stated that the alleged ground for the writ was
abuse of discretion which is not a ground for its issuance. The court
noted that Ex Parte Jones' and the cases cited therein clearly state that
the writ will not lie under any circumstances to prevent an erroneous
decision. Here, the court quoted from Oklahoma Operating Co. v.
Love'2 where the United States Supreme Court stated: "The challenge
of a prescribed rate as being confiscatory raises a question not as to
the scope of the Commission's authority, but of correctness of the
exercise of its judgment."'2
The final reason stated by the court for the denial of the writ was
that there were adequate and applicable statutory review provisions.
24
There had been no allegation that any petitioner had ever sought a
review of any decision of the respondent as provided by the cited stat-
utes or that the statutes failed to provide petitioners wth adequate
relief.
RICHARD J. PAUL
121. 160 S.C. 63, 158 S.E. 134, 137 (1931). See especially Holladay v. Hodge, 84
S.C. 91, 65 S.E. 952 (1909).
122. 252 U.S. 331, 336 (1919).
123. 182S.E.2d at 83.
124. Id. at 84. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 37-701, 37-70 to 37-74,46-719 (1962).
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